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WATER ALLOCATION COMPACTS IN THE WEST: AN OVERVIEW
Douglas S. Kenney, Ph.D.1

INTRODUCTION
In the American West, questions of allocation typically dominate interstate water
disputes. There are two common approaches for resolving these conflicts.2 First, as the
holder of “original jurisdiction” in disputes among states, the U.S. Supreme Court is
empowered to resolve interstate complaints. Traditionally, this has been done using the
highly flexible doctrine of “equitable apportionment” in which considerations of equity
and need are used to craft allocations that can be later revisited by the Court should
conditions change. The initial use of equitable apportionment was on the Arkansas River
between Colorado and Kansas in 1907, although the most celebrated case in 1931
concerned the Delaware River.3
The second and much more common approach for resolving interstate conflicts in
the West has been the use of interstate compacts (McCormick, 1994). Compacts are
legally binding agreements between states, as authorized by the compact clause of the
Constitution. States generally prefer compacts over equitable apportionment proceedings
since they can retain control over the dispute resolution process, the terms of the ultimate
agreement, and the implementation arrangements. Compacts also allow allocations to
occur long before needs materialize, which can greatly aid long-term planning and
management programs. For these and other reasons, even the courts typically encourage
compacts over judicial proceedings.4
Twenty-two interstate compacts containing a specific water allocation formula
can be found west of the Mississippi River.5 They are listed below:
1. Arkansas River Compact of 1948
2. Arkansas River Compact of 1965
3. Arkansas River Compact of 1970
1

Research Associate, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law. Contact the
author at: Natural Resources Law Center, UCB 401, Boulder, CO, 80309-0401, (303) 492-1296,
Douglas.Kenney@colorado.edu.
2
Arguably, a third strategy also exists, but it is far from common: congressional apportionment. This
approach is not included here because it has only been observed in one, highly unusual situation, and is
generally not expected to emerge again as a means for interstate apportionment. The case in question
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4. Bear River Compact of 1978 (originally 1955)
5. Belle Fourche River Compact of 1943
6. Big Blue River Compact of 1971
7. Caddo Lake Compact of 1979
8. Canadian River Compact of 1950
9. Colorado River Compact of 1922
10. Costilla Creek Compact of 1963 (originally 1944)
11. Klamath River Compact of 1957
12. La Plata River Compact of 1922
13. Pecos River Compact of 1948
14. Red River Compact of 1978
15. Republican River Compact of 1942
16. Rio Grande Compact of 1938
17. Sabine River Compact of 1953
18. Snake River Compact of 1949
19. South Platte River Compact of 1923
20. Upper Colorado River Compact of 1948
21. Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962
22. Yellowstone River Compact of 1950
Interstate water allocation compacts are also becoming fashionable in the East, as
found in the Delaware, Susquehanna, Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF), and
Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River Basins. The Delaware and Susquehanna
compacts are unique in that they involve the federal government as a signatory and
partner (so-called federal-interstate compacts) (GAO, 1981). The agreements in the
ACT/ACF basins are unique in that they do not include allocation formulas, but rather
establish commissions empowered to later devise allocation compacts—an ongoing
exercise.
Typically, the negotiation and approval of interstate compacts has followed a 5step process: (1) Congress authorizes the states to negotiate a compact, (2) state
legislatures appoint commissioners, (3) the commissioners meet, usually aided by a
federal chairman, to negotiate and sign the agreement, (4) the state legislatures ratify the
compact, and (5) Congress ratifies the compact. Omitted from this description is the
common role of federal water development in stimulating agreements, as the Department
of the Interior typically required states to resolve interstate water allocation disputes prior
to commencing federally funded river basin developments. The best example of this
phenomenon occurred in the Upper Colorado River Basin, where a Bureau of
Reclamation study identifying 134 potential projects prompted the basin states within
four months to begin compact negotiations.
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ALLOCATION FORMULAS
The key element in interstate water allocation compacts is the mathematical
formula used to apportion flows. The treatment of two related variables best explains the
different approaches seen in allocation formulas: (1) the type of hydrologic standards
used, and (2) the time scale over which the hydrologic variables are measured:
§

Hydrologic Standards: Four general approaches can be identified pertaining
to the type of hydrologic standards used: (1) systems based on maintaining
minimum flow levels at state lines (or other useful gauging stations), (2)
approaches based on reservoir storage, (3) formulas allocating fixed or
percentage-based rights to consumption or diversion, and (4) a requirement
for upstream states to deliver downstream a minimum volume (rather than a
constant flow rate) over a lengthy time period.

§

Time Scale: Four general approaches can be identified pertaining to the time
scales employed in operation of the allocation formula: (1) constant
requirements (same standard in effect at all times); (2) seasonal requirements,
(3) annual requirements (i.e., typically a “water year” standard); and (4) a
multi-year requirement.

Another parameter occasionally of concern is the type of information required as
inputs for formula operation, in part because this has great implications for administrative
arrangements. Some approaches require daily measurements or calculations; others only
require this information periodically or under special circumstances; while others—such
as those limiting the construction of storage capacity—do have require any field
monitoring. As a practical matter, information needs are primarily a function of the
hydrologic standards and time scales employed.
Table 1 provides a summary of the approaches used in the 22 compacts studied.
(All tables are provided at the end of the document.)

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
Administering compact allocations and resolving conflicts are duties frequently
delegated to compact commissions formed by the interstate agreements. Eighteen of the
22 compacts either establish, or provide for the establishment of, a compact commission.
When a commission is established, a key decision is whether or not a federal member
should be included, and if so, whether that member should have full voting rights in the
decision making of the body. Fourteen of the 22 compacts studied have a federal
member, but only in one case—the Upper Colorado River Commission—does that
member have a vote. This information is summarized in Table 2.
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PROBLEMS WITH INTERSTATE COMPACTS
Several compacts have been highly problematic. Examples include those for the
La Plata, Pecos, Canadian, Arkansas, Rio Grande, and Colorado Rivers. Problems
usually stem from noncompliance with compact terms, incorrect assumptions about
precipitation and runoff levels, the omission of key factors in the apportionment formula
(e.g., the failure to consider surface water/groundwater connections), and growth of water
demands in some areas beyond compact apportionments (Kenney, 1996). Most of these
problems can be avoided in new compacts by basing apportionments on percentages
(rather than absolute values), utilizing good scientific data, providing a strong
Commission and related means of administration and dispute resolution, and by
broadening the scope of the agreement somewhat to include related topics influencing,
and influenced by, the apportionment.

COMMON OMISSIONS
A growing concern in many of the western water allocation compacts is their
narrow focus, which is problematic given the salient impact of water allocation on other
facets of water management. For this reason, these compacts are often felt to have
serious substantive omissions. One of the easiest ways to document these omissions is to
search the text of the agreement for key terms. Some of the more potentially serious
omissions are discussed below, and summarized in Table 3.

GROUNDWATER (search terms: groundwater, ground water, aquifer)
A failure to consider the groundwater/surface water connection is at the heart of
many problematic compacts. Any reference to groundwater occurs in only three of the
22 compacts studied: the Bear River Compact (1955, 1978), the Klamath River Compact
of 1957, and the Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962. More often than not, these few
references sidestep the issue of groundwater/surface water connections, defining some
groundwater as outside the scope of the agreement, and postponing any action on
groundwater to a future negotiation following technical studies:
§

In two instances, the Bear River Compact (1955, 1978) mentions
groundwater: once to clarify that tributary groundwater is part of a specific
apportionment rule, and once to mention that both surface water and
groundwater used for small-scale domestic and stock watering purposes are
outside the scope of the compact apportionment.

§

The Klamath River Compact of 1957 essentially defines groundwater as
outside the scope of the agreement, which is confined to water “appearing on
the surface of the ground in streams, lakes or otherwise, regardless of whether
such waters at any time were or will become ground water, but shall not

4

include water extracted from underground sources until after such water is
used and becomes surface return flow or waste water” (emphasis added).
§

The Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962 apportions surface water, but
recognizes a desire to later apportion groundwater pending further study.
Specifically, the states of “Nebraska and Wyoming recognize that the future
use of ground water for irrigation in the Niobrara River basin may be a factor
in the depletion of the surface flows of the Niobrara River, and since the data
now available are inadequate to make a determination in regard to this matter,
any apportionment of the ground water of the Niobrara River basin should be
delayed until such time as adequate date [data] on ground water of the basin
are available.”

NATIVE AMERICAN WATER INTERESTS (search terms: Indian, tribe, tribal, Native
American, indigenous)
Nine compacts make at least a reference to Native American interests in the
waters apportioned: the Bear River Compact of 1955 (and 1978), the Canadian River
Compact of 1950, the Colorado River Compact of 1922, the Klamath River Compact of
1957, the Rio Grande Compact of 1938, the Snake River Compact of 1949, the Upper
Colorado River Compact of 1948, the Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962, and the
Yellowstone River Compact of 1950.6 In each case, however, no meaningful effort is
made to quantify or include tribal water rights into the apportionment.
Regarding Indian water rights, the compacts use remarkably similar,
“boilerplate,” language. The language of the Colorado River Compact of 1922
established the standard that the others closely follow: “Nothing in this compact shall be
construed as affecting the obligations of the United States of America to Indian tribes.”
By identifying tribal water rights as a federal obligation, the apportionment among the
states is, presumably, unaffected. The Snake River Compact of 1949, however,
recognizes an important but normally unspoken caveat of the apportionment that is likely
true in the other compacts: “The water required to satisfy these rights shall be charged
against the allocation made to the state in which the Indians and their lands are located.”

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (search terms: environment, environmental)
The term “environment” or “environmental” shows up in two of the 22 compacts:
the Red River Compact of 1978, and the Caddo Lake Compact of 1979. However, since
the Caddo Lake Compact is a further refinement of the apportionment already described
in the Red River Compact, these two references could arguably be viewed as one. (Note
that these are two of the three youngest of the 22 compacts.)
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The Caddo Lake Compact articulates a desire to “preserve and protect Caddo
Lake as a valuable environmental, cultural and natural resource and enhance water
resource and recreational potentials, while allowing its utilization for water needs of
adjacent portions of Louisiana and Texas” (emphasis added). (It also contains a stray
reference to the National Environmental Policy Act.) The Red River Compact,
meanwhile, contains references to the problem of water pollution, and its potential to
result in “adverse social, economic, and environmental impacts” (emphasis added).

FISH AND WILDLIFE (search terms: fish, fishery, fisheries, wildlife, wildfowl)
References to fish and/or wildlife occur in only four of the 22 compacts: the Big
Blue River Compact of 1971, the Klamath River Compact of 1957, the Red River
Compact of 1978, and the Snake River Compact of 1949.
§

The Big Blue Compact apportions water supply storage limits that are exclusive
of storage needed for “improvement of water quality, for fishery, wildlife, or
recreation purposes” (emphasis added).

§

The scope of the Klamath Compact includes the “use of water for domestic
purposes; the development of lands by irrigation and other means; the protection
and enhancement of fish, wildlife and recreational resources; the use of water for
industrial purposes and hydroelectric power production; and the use and control
of water for navigation and flood prevention” (emphasis added). To the extent
that insufficient water is available to satisfy all uses, the compact further states
that fish and wildlife issues will be given priority over industrial and hydroelectric
uses, but will be junior to domestic uses and irrigation.

§

The Red River Compact mentions adverse impacts to “fish and other aquatic life”
as one example of pollution.

§

The Snake River Compact identifies certain types of reservoirs where releases—
not to exceed 5 cubic feet/second—are required, as necessary, to maintain fish
and wildlife and for stock water use.

In no case is the protection of fish and wildlife a serious area of focus, and only in
the Klamath Compact are fish and wildlife issues mentioned several times.
“Biodiversity” is never mentioned in the 22 compacts.

WATER QUALITY (search terms: water quality, pollution)
The 22 western compacts selected for study are those featuring water allocation
formulas. Some compacts lacking allocation formulas but dealing with pollution exist,
but are generally found in the eastern United States. Of the 22 western compacts, 6 (of
the mostly younger compacts) mention water quality and/or pollution: the Arkansas River
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Compact of 1965, the Arkansas River Compact of 1970, the Big Blue River Compact of
1971, the Caddo Lake Compact of 1979, the Klamath River Compact of 1957, and the
Red River Compact of 1978.
Most of these compacts are similar in structure (and language) regarding
pollution, identifying deteriorating water quality as a problem of mutual concern, and
committing to an active pollution-abatement program. The relevant commissions are
instructed to collect information, promote coordination among existing pollution control
organizations, and in rare occasions, to take regulatory action. For example, the Klamath
Commission, is empowered, when necessary, to issue binding and legally enforceable
pollution control regulations. Similarly, under very specific and limited conditions, the
Red River Commission can litigate to ensure full compliance with existing regulations.

DROUGHTS AND RELATED EMERGENCIES (search terms: climate, drought)
Few compacts make specific references to drought conditions, perhaps because
well-designed allocation formulas anticipate shortages. Nonetheless, it is odd that only
one of the 22 compacts studied mentions the term “drought.”7 That reference occurs in
the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948, which merely empowers the
Commission to “Make findings of fact in the event of the occurrence of extraordinary
drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in the upper basin…”
The issue of drought management is more explicitly addressed in two of the three
compacts that feature the term “emergency.” The Caddo Lake Compact of 1979
empowers the Commission to authorize diversions during an emergency or other
catastrophic event, “such as destruction of a municipality or political subdivision's other
water supply source or a drawdown which is more severe than the critical drawdown of
record.” A much more precise strategy is outlined in the Bear River Compact of 1978,
which provides a specific apportionment schedule for times of water emergency, defined
in terms of flows below a given theshold. The other compact mentioning emergencies,
the Klamath River Compact of 1957, is simply in reference to a temporary waiving of the
public hearing requirement as part of rulemaking.
In contrast, note that floods are mentioned in 8 compacts, and mentioned
repeatedly in two compacts: the Pecos River Compact of 1948, and the Red River
Compact of 1978. These references are necessary to account for excess flows that can be
subject to further apportionment.

OTHER PROBLEMS WITH COMPACTS
These “omissions” can hinder the utility of compacts as the basis for interstate
water management. In addition to the problems associated with the substantive
omissions, compacts can raise other concerns and problems—e.g.:
7
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§

While water allocation compacts often provide an element of certainty, stability, and
civility in interstate water issues, this certainty can be somewhat counterproductive,
in that it can eliminate the need and opportunity for continued interaction among the
basin states. With the very limited exception of periodic meetings of compact
commissioners, so-called “successful” compacts generally do not require interstate
coordination or ongoing cooperation, and provide little reason for one state to be
concerned with the water needs of the other.

§

Similarly, the stability offered by a compact apportionment can, in certain
circumstances, be viewed as inflexibility. Unlike an equitable apportionment,
compacts cannot be modified unilaterally except, perhaps, by congressional action—
and no congress has demonstrated an interest in testing that power. Additionally,
unlike intrastate water rights administered under a prior appropriation scheme,
compact water rights are generally not believed to be marketable at the interstate
scale. No western compact mentions interstate marketing. While this “omission” is
generally viewed as desirable by the signatory states, it is nonetheless a source of
inflexibility in water systems that are generally acknowledged to need greater
flexibility. For these and related reasons, compacts should only be considered as
useful tools for allocation, not reallocation.

§

Compacts also do not usually reconcile hydrologic and political regions. While the
signatories to a compact may collectively encompass the entire drainage basin of a
particular river, the boundaries of those states do not follow the actual contours of the
river basin. Consequently, within states, issues arise about whether to use compact
apportionments within the basin itself, or in areas outside the basin. Many of the
largest users of the Colorado River, for example, lie outside the topographic bounds
of the river basin (e.g., Los Angeles), but are within the states recognized in the
compacts. Issues of intrastate allocation normally fall to other state law and political
processes.8

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Water allocation compacts in the West have been effectively used to resolve (and
preempt) dozens of interstate water conflicts. This is a significant accomplishment, and
suggests an ongoing need for compacting processes. Yet, it is important to realize the
limitations of the compact approach. Many compacts are problematic in various ways,
and few offer any basis for truly integrated management at the basin scale. In part, this is
a reflection of the circumstances and era in which most of the compacts were negotiated:
most were enacted to clear the way for dam-building projects, and only 2 of the
compacts, for example, were enacted (in their original version) after passage of the Clean
Water Act in 1972. Compacts aggressively addressing issues such as water quality
8
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management, flood control and planning, and project integration are relatively common,
but are generally confined to the Midwest and East, and are generally distinct from the
western agreements focused on allocation (Muys, 1971). Similarly, only in the East do
you see the federal-interstate compacts (that include the federal government as a
signatory and equal partner), and in no circumstance do you see a significant effort to
include tribal interests in these regional agreements. And compact commissions, where
they exist, are usually very modest organizations with very narrow functions and
authorities. Thus, while there is no reason why water allocation compacts cannot be a
stepping-stone to more integrated and sophisticated regional water management, that is
simply not what has happened in practice. If additional compacts are to be crafted in the
future, it would be reasonable to demand a little more ambition from the negotiators.
Despite these concerns about the limited scope of most compacts, the fact remains
that the success of future water allocation compacts is still primarily tied to the quality of
the allocation formulas crafted. A good formula is normally one based on accurate and
complete information, easily measured hydrologic parameters, and that anticipates all
relevant complicating factors—such as the surface/ground-water connection. The design
should reflect the physical and institutional features in the basin, including the
infrastructure of water projects and gauges, the availability of information (and technical
understanding), the water needs of the residents, and the current and emerging water
management challenges.
Prior to enactment, draft formulas should be evaluated with respect to the
following questions (Kenney, 1996):
§

Could special situations arise in which the allocation formula is simply not
functional, or confusion exists in the apportionment of limited (or excessive)
flows?

§

Will the Commission (or other administrative body) be expected to make
decisions based on incomplete or poor information, or be expected to
frequently make “judgment calls”?

§

Could one of the following factors or events disrupt the functioning of the
allocation formula:
o changes to the physical system through natural processes;
o new water developments or uses;
o situations in which water quality influences water supply;
o natural depletions, including environmental needs;
o interbasin transfers;
o exercise or redefinition of tribal water rights or federal reserved rights;
o extreme events (droughts and floods) and long-term climatic change;
o surface water/groundwater interactions.

§

Will the proposed formula create any special problems for, on demands on,
water administrators?
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§

Will the Commission (or similar body) lack adequate access to resources,
expertise and authority?

§

Does the agreement lack a dispute resolution mechanism?

§

Does the agreement violate norms of fairness and political expertise?

If the answer to any of these questions is “yes,” then additional work is required.
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TABLE 1. WATER ALLOCATION COMPACTS IN THE WEST: ALLOCATION FORMULAS
Compact

Hydrologic Standard Used

Time Scale of the Hydrologic
Standard

1948

X

Arkansas

KS, OK

1965

X

Arkansas

AR, OK

1970

Bear

ID, UT, WY

1955,
1978

Belle
Fourche

WY, SD

1943

Big Blue

NE, KS

1971

Caddo Lake

LA, TX

1979

Canadian

NM, TX, OK

1950

Colorado

WY, CO, UT,
NM, NW, AZ,
CA
CO, NM

1922

1944,
1963

X

Klamath

OR, CA

1957

X

La Plata

CO, NM

1922

X

Pecos

NM, TX

1948

X

Red

TX, OK, AR, LA

1978

X

X

Republican

CO, NE, KS

1942

X

X

Rio Grande

CO, NM, TX

1938

Sabine

TX, LA

1953

Snake

WY, ID

1949

South Platte

CO, NE

1923

Upper
Colorado

WY, CO, UT,
NM

1948

Upper
Niobrara
Yellowstone

WY, NE

1962

WY, MT, ND

1950

Costilla
Creek

Annual

Seasonal

Consumptive
Amount

X
X
X

X

X

Multi-Year

CO, KS

Constant

Arkansas

Delivery Volume
(annual or longer)

Year

Reservoir Storage

Signatory
States

Minimum Flows

Basin

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X

12

X

TABLE 2. WATER ALLOCATION COMPACTS IN THE WEST: ADMINISTRATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS
Compact
Basin

States

Commission Exists
Year

Yes

No

Federal Member
Yes

Arkansas

CO, KS

1948

X

X

Arkansas

KS, OK

1965

X

X

Arkansas

AR, OK

1970

X

X

Bear

ID, UT, WY

1955,
1978

X

X

Belle
Fourche

WY, SD

1943

Big Blue

NE, KS

1971

X

Caddo Lake

LA, TX

1979

X

Canadian

NM, TX, OK

1950

X

Colorado

WY, CO, UT,
NM, NW, AZ,
CA
CO, NM

1922

1944,
1963

X

Klamath

OR, CA

1957

X

La Plata

CO, NM

1922

X

Pecos

NM, TX

1948

X

X

Red

TX, OK, AR, LA

1978

X

X

Republican

CO, NE, KS

1942

X

X

Rio Grande

CO, NM, TX

1938

X

X

Sabine

TX, LA

1953

X

X

Snake

WY, ID

1949

South Platte

CO, NE

1923

X

Upper
Colorado

WY, CO, UT,
NM

1948

X

Upper
Niobrara
Yellowstone

WY, NE

1962

WY, MT, ND

1950

Costilla
Creek

X

No

No commission
X
X
X

X

No commission

X
X
X

X

No commission
X
X

X
X

No commission
X
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TABLE 3. WATER ALLOCATION COMPACTS IN THE WEST: SCOPE
Compact
Basin

States

The following terms (and their variants) appear in the text:
Year Groundwater

Indian
Rights

Environment

Fish &
Wildlife

Water
Quality

Arkansas

CO, KS

1948

Arkansas

KS, OK

1965

X

Arkansas

AR, OK

1970

X

Bear

ID, UT, WY

1955,
1978

Belle
Fourche

WY, SD

1943

Big Blue

NE, KS

1971

Caddo Lake

LA, TX

1979

Canadian

NM, TX, OK

1950

X

Colorado

WY, CO, UT,
NM, NW, AZ,
CA
CO, NM

1922

X

Klamath

OR, CA

1957

La Plata

CO, NM

1922

Pecos

NM, TX

1948

Red

TX, OK, AR, LA

1978

Republican

CO, NE, KS

1942

Rio Grande

CO, NM, TX

1938

Sabine

TX, LA

1953

Snake

WY, ID

1949

South Platte

CO, NE

1923

Upper
Colorado

WY, CO, UT,
NM

1948

Upper
Niobrara
Yellowstone

WY, NE

1962

WY, MT, ND

1950

Costilla
Creek

X

Drought

X

X
X

X
X

1944,
1963
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X
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